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Andrew Bowie, From Romantici.m to Critical Theory: The Philo.ophy
o(Ge17fUJn Literary Theory, London and New York: Routledge, 1997,
'It is increasingly apparent that we lack an appropriate archaeology ofcontemporary
'literary theory" (p.28), writes Andrew Bowie-before embarking, successfully
if not exhaustively, uponjustlhat. By 'an appropriate archaeology', Bowie means
one designed at once to supplement and at the same time to correct the account
offered by literary theory of its own origins, one that will clarify and 'demystify'
theory's ideas and aims by bringing them into a working and respectable relation
with the ideas and aims of post-Kantian 'metaphysics' as well as of modern
analytic philosophy. More bluntly, From ROfTUlnticism to Critical Theory is a
reaction to the unjustified claims that have been made for the originality and
iconoclasm of recent literary theory, which, like its idols Nietzsche, Freud, and
Heidegger, is 'too often credited'-not only by theory itself, but also by its
antagonists amongst the literary scholars-with fundamental innovations that had
actually already been initiated by others' (p.134). On the contrary, argues Bowie,
it is Kant and post-Kantian German philosophy-the focus is on Kant, Jacobi,
Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, and Schleiermacher in the nineteenth century (with
extended reference to Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. Hamann, and Herder). and on
Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, Habermas, Gadamer, Benjamin, Wittgenstein, and
Adorno in the twentieth-that constitutes 'the historical and theoretical 'condition
of possibility' of the new wave of theory that developed from the 1960s onwards
in the work of Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida. Paul de Man and
others' (p.3) although in From ROfTUlnticism to Critical Theory 'theory' is most
often represented by Derrida, Lyotard, and the pragmatist Richard Rorty). German
philosophy, according to Bowie, is a continuous tradition that has to be credited
not only with initiating what have become fashionable 'ideas' and 'issues' (as
distinct from arguments, a word Bowie rarely uses), but also with genuine
iconoclasm. Hence the subtitle of the Introduction: 'renewing the theoretical
canon'-rediscovering, that is. and thus extending; broadening the historical base
of literary theory while indirectly but insistently asking students of literature and
philosophy themselves to confer on the issues raised by that tradition.
This last point I take to be crucial. for Bowie's study is more than just a
systematic exposure of the derivativeness of the emperor's new clothes-indeed
the question of direct debt is carefully avoided-it is also inspired by the 'failures'
both of anti-theoretical literary critics and of philosophers to appreciate the sorts
of questions that theory is asking and how far these are questions that should be
shared across the two disciplines (p.281). Beyond everything else, From
ROfTUlnticism to Critical Theory is a plea for interdisciplinary co-operation to
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overcome the redundancies and blindness~s of a jealous and intellectually
unjustifiable academic isolationism and to ensure the survival of the fittest: 'the
need to integrate the disciplines of literary studies and modem philosophy in new
ways is, I propose, vital to the long-term health of both disciplines' (p.2).
Their coming together over a neglected philosophical tradition would mean,
first among other things, that the philosopher and the student of literature would
be in a stronger position to resist the ideological reductionism and demystification
of 'literature' being carried out by historical and cultural materialism, fast becoming
institutionally and intellectually the only option available to a literary studies
whose 'legitimation is now lacking' (p.2). In one very vital sense which in
Bowie's introduction only gradually becomes apparent, From Romanticism to
Critical Theory is offered as both a complement and an antidote to Terry
Eagleton's Ideology o/the Aesthetic (Blackwell, 1990), whose sustained, often
deconstructive critique of many of the same thinkers that Bowie treats-Kant,
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietsehze, Heidegger, Adorno, Lyotard, Habermas,
Derrida, and Rorty-is characteristically preoccupied with the historical and
political implications of flawed logic and discursive detail. From Romanticism to
Critical Theory, on the other hand, deploys a judicious selection of quotations as
part of a sequence of uncritical, interpretati ve paraphrases to isolate its pri vi leged
'issues': 'the truth-potential in art that is more than just ideology' (p.8) and 'the
revaluation of interpretation which ensues from a mistrust ofboth epistemological
and semantic foundationalism' (p.1 04). Concerned to demonstrate the continuity
of these issues and to provoke a reassessment, Bowie is inclined to take the
philosophers themselves at their own word.
None of this, however-not the challenge to the misplaced vanity of literary
theory and the ways in which theory has wilfully misread 'traditional metaphysics'
to trumpet its own originality; not the challenge to modem philosophy to recognize
the immediate relevance of 'questions of literature to central philosophical questions
concerning art and truth' (p.9); not the challenge to the children of the New and
practical criticism in departments of English, and to their colleagues the scholarly
positivists, to address themselves to the questions raised by theory and prevent
their 'conversation about poetry' from deteriorating into 'wine parties of second-
rate and commonplace people' (Protagoras 347; quoted p.I); not the challenge to
the Marxists to recognize that in explaining everything, ideology explains nothing,
rendering the subject indifferent to what is known and impotent in the act of
knowing-none of this is stated as directly as I state it here, much less argued
rigorously or at length. This is not from any want of either understanding or
courage on Bowie's part-indeed, his position is made clear enough for me to be
able to reconstruct it here. Rather it is because Bowie's is a diplomatic exercise
involving complex orchestration. For example, each of the too self-contained
'interest groups' variously challenged throughout the discussion is also credited
with making a valuable contribution: if, contra Eagleton, 'literature' (and
philosophy, come to that) has a viable if contingent status both practically and
theoretically, still the ideological is granted its own (again contingent) explanatory
force; if to become both responsible and indeed meaningful the act of literary
interpretation needs to be initiated into its own procedures and thus into the
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wherefores ofphilosophy and its doppelganger theory, still interpretation is found
to have valid motives and objectives; if theorists like Derrida are less remarkable,
both inherently and historically, than their argumentative and stylistic mannerisms
would have us believe, still they continue to ask the right questions and to
reconfront the abiding issue of the grounds for knowledge; and so on.
This diplomatic apportioning of praise, blame, and subsequent responsibility
collaborates with a natural tendency in Bowie's writing to diffuseness and delay.
An anxiety about being overcome by his own involved and onerous narrative far
too frequently erupts into phrases of the 'as we shall see in Chapter X below' kind,
even to the point of editorial laxness: 'One fundamental way of seeing the issue
will, as we shall see, recur in different fonns right up until the present day' (p.33).
We are constantly being told that the significance of this or that idea will become
apparent later, even while it is, of course, being made apparent then and there.
Having arrived at the middle to later chapters in which everything is supposed to
happen or be revealed, moreover, we are referred to earlier ones ('It should be
obvious from preceding chapters that a great deal turns on exactly what language
itself is understood to be', p.183; 'There are, remember, very divergent ways of
taking seriously the idea that art-particularly literature-is connected to truth, as
should already be evident', p.185). It is not that Bowie has not said all that he
intended to say or that it wasn't worth saying, rather that at no point in the long
narrative do we have a sense of arriving or having arrived at just that-a point: an
argument conducted rigorously to its conclusion with a point being made that
stands explicitly and contestably there. Indeed, at his most decisive, as on the
unique occasion when Nietzsche is roundly condemned as overrated as a
philosopher and repugnant as a human being-'one of the most hectoring,
derivative, self-obsessed and generally reactionary modem theorists to put pen to
paper' (p.27)--Bowie refers the reader elsewhere for the actual argument. to the
eighth chapter of his own Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche
(Manchester, 1990).
Beyond remarking the sacrifice ofdetail, rigour, and force made for the sake of
introducing an interdisciplinary readership to some of the most abstruse ideas of
Gennan philosophical idealism, two observations occur to me. The first is in
response to Bowie's wondering why it is that the insights of Gennan Romantic
philosophy are not better known to controversial theorists and modem analytic
philosophers alike. There does seem to be a whole area of ideas rather than
specifically of philosophy that a study of this kind cannot accommodate, one
represented by books like David Simpson's RoTtUlnticism, Nationalism, and the
Revolt against Theory (Chicago, 1993), whose title is self-explanatory. The
individual and national or cultural motives behind the transmission or suppression
of 'issues' present a complex field to which philosophy as Bowie conceives it,
even while it is at every point implicated, must remain indifferent. When, for
example, the Whig Lord Byron wished out loud that the Tory student of
contemporary Gennan metaphysics, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 'would explain
his explanation', he didn't really want to know what Coleridge was on about.
Again, more recently: why should an intellectual movement like Existentialism,
whose debts to Gennan Romantic philosophy were far more extensive and far
cruder than were those of the French intellectuals of the generation after 1968,
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have proved so fertile in other areas of artistic endeavour in the West? There is
more beyond philosophy than merely ideological reductionism of the kind rightly
chal1enged by Bowie. Rather there is a more faithful and capacious 'historical
and theoretical "condition of possibility" , than any strictly philosophical tradition
could hope to comprehend. And this is especial1y true when the 'historical and
theoretical "condition of possibility" , bears directly on what are, ultimately,
moral decisions-like the decisions concerning the separate and corporate
responsibilities of different academic disciplines and the way in which they
should develop that are so urgent for Bowie himself.
My second and last point is admittedly neither historical nor philosophical, but
concerns a nonetheless nagging problem: in spite of the 'change in orientation
towards the aesthetic' (p.5), indeed of the curious triumph of literature that Bowie
traces in the history of philosophy, as wel1 as in the critical theory he anatomizes
and in his own project of 'renewal'; in spite of the deference throughout From
Romanticism to Critical Theory to 'great literary works' (p.24) and of its persistent
return to fundamental 'questions about language, truth, art and interpretation'
(p.281), there is no criticism of. meditation on. or even extended reference to any
work of literature (though very occasional1y a film or a piece of music achieves
honorific notice). Nor is there any sense either that novels. poems, and plays-or
works of history and phi losophy as 'literature' , for that matter-are pleasurable in
themselves orthat they matter, personally or cultural1y. But I am prepared to take
Andrew Bowie's word for that.
William Christie
The Leite,.. of George Henry Lewe., ed. William Baker, Department of
English, University of Victoria, British Columbia: English Literary
Studies Monograph Series 64-5, 1995.
This edition prints 442 letters of George Henry Lewes together with summaries of
57 more (these are mostly notes confinning appointments and the like: today's
phone call or e-mail). It is designed where possible to avoid duplication of letters
that have already appeared in the nine volumes of Gordon S. Haight's magisterial
The George Eliot Letters (1954-78), which includes 722 of Lewes's letters.
though Baker places great emphasis on the fact that he has more accurate texts of
letters previously published in Haight and elsewhere.
The letters range in date from 1834, when Lewes was 17, to the month of his
death, November 1878. About one-third of the letters, and something approaching
two-fifths of the pages, date from the period before 1854, when, by eloping to
Gennany with Marian Evans, Lewes took the step that was to secure his reputation.
The story these pages have to tel1 is of an immensely energetic and enthusiastic
man, with all kinds of literary, historical, philosophical and scientific interests,
whose versatility is apparent in the various personae adopted in his correspondence.
The early letters mostly concern professional and intel1ectual interests, while
showing him also to be much involved with his family: not only his young wife
and their children, but also his mother and other relations. One question is
inescapable: if the 'Ravensbourne' on which Lewes crossed the English Channel
en route to Gennany with the woman who became the great novelist George Eliot
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had foundered, how would he have been .known to posterity? If at all, as a
journalist who met an untimely end, and who wrote some novels and plays, and
a durable Biographical History of Philosophy (1845-46, later revised and
expanded}-for his most significant work, the Life of Goethe (1855), Sea-Side
Studies (1858), The Physiology ofCommon Life (1859--60), Problems ofLife and
Mind (1874-79), together with his stint as inaugural editor of the Fonnightly
Review (1865-66), lay in the future. .
The plain fact is that for all Lewes's versatility, it is his relationship to George
Eliot that is the most interesting thing about him, and the most significant aspect
of this edition of his letters. From the time of their'common law union in 1854, he
increasingly gave himself over to the nurture and service of the split personality
with whom he lived out his days, known to him by affectionate names like
Pollian; to friends and family variously as Marian, Miss Evans, Mrs Lewes,
Madonna, and so on; and to the world as George Eliot. His devotion is apparent to
the end. The last letter in Baker's edition is a brief note, in French, on I November
1878, to George Eliot's close friend, Bamara Bodichon, arranging for her to visit.
The last of Lewes's letters in Haight IS on 21 November, accompanying the
manuscript of George Eliot's Impressions ofTheophrastus Such to the Edinburgh
publisher John Blackwood. Lewes died of enteritis on 30 November.
His role as George Eliot's agent and manager is well demonstrated by his
correspondence. Baker has some new letters to Blackwood (though curiously
appears to imply on p. 31 that George Eliot's novels were routinely serialised in
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine), and an important group of previously
unpublished letters to George Smith, whose offer for Romola led her to desert
Blackwood. One of the revelations of this'edition, though, is that he performed
similar duties on behalf of his wife Agnes: in 1847 he wrote to the publisher John
Murray about her adaptations and translatio!ls (letters 76-7). There are no letters
to George Eliot, however: in her Journal she noted that she re-read them on the
anniversary of his death, and requested that they be buried with her.
This edition at once becomes indispensable as a work of reference. Its layout
replicates Lewes's subordination in life to his more famous consort, conveniently
following the style of Haight's George Eliot Letters. Baker provides useful
annotation, including cross-referencing to Haight (on whom the annotation· is
inevitably dependent), together with an appendix of letters to Lewes held in the
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale (the major repository of
Eliot and Lewes manuscript material), and indices of correspondents, and of
names, places and subjects. The letters are divided into chronological groupings,
though the headnotes tend to be summaries of what is in·the·letters rather than
tactful reminders of what is not. For instance, there is no mention of John Cross in
the headnote to either of the !list two sections, until his marriage to George Eliot in
May 1880 is reported without comment: Cross's friendship'with and assistance to
both. Georges, especially in their search for a country house, might have been
mentioned. The edition appears to be generally reliable, though it behoves a
reviewer to demonstrate attentive reading by pointing out errors and omissions.
Accordingly: 'correspondance' appears frequently where 'correspondence' would
be correct-<>nly in letter 132 is there an ellonerating '[sic]'; at letter 63, Lubin's
dating is clearly correct; it is surprising that a note to letter 245, glossing 'Bertie's
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wife safely delivered of a boy', does not report that Lewes's son Bertie and his
wife ingratiatingly named their second child, born 16 May 1875, George Herbert.
His elder sister was Marian Evans Lewes. And in places Baker misinterprets: for
instance, in letter 15 to Karl Vamhagen von Ense he misses the point that Lewes
is flattering his correspondent by referring to a long article he is completing on the
work of the German scholar, which takes precedence over a budget of Lewes's
own news to follow.
The greatest interest of this colIection comes from the light it casts on the dai Iy
lives of George Eliot and George Lewes, particularly on their travels. To single
out just one example, the letters (347-52) dealing with their journey to Spain in
1866-67 show Lewes in inimitable form. These include some to his good-natured
eldest son Charles in which the engaging humour of other letters to his sons
especially in their boyhood years still emerges, though he became increasingly
fussy about such matters as household arrangements during an absence. Ofcourse
the letters also have much to tell about Lewes's own career, especially his
scientific researches in the I850s and 18605: among other things it is good to have
complete the letters to Dickens on spontaneous combustion (145-7).
William Baker in producing this important edition has performed a service
which would have gratified George Eliot, whose devotion 'To my dear husband,
George Henry Lewes' (as she inscribed the manuscript of Adam Bede), in its way
rivalled Lewes's to her.
Margaret Harris
S. N. Mukherjee, Citiun HidorWn: Explorotionll in Hutoriogrophy,
Sydney Association for Studies in Society and Culture, Sydney, and
Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 1996.
At a time when it's still all the rage in some circles of Australian historical writing
to cloak one's views in a post-modernist garment or two, this reviewer must come
clean right away and reveal that he is not only short of a post-modernist garment,
he doesn't even sport so much as a fig-leaf. 'It's all in the mind, you know', says
Wallace Greenslade at the end of the Goon Show, and that is true enough of the
Goon universe that was created by Spike Milligan's BBC steam radio Big Bang.
But fans know very well that if they were to assume that this holds for the world
in which their bodies take up space, they would have little hope of stepping off the
pavement of a busy street and reaching the other side unscathed. One must
suppose that whatever post-modernists may say about the construction of reality,
they really know this very well too. But proceeding with his list of true confessions,
this reviewer must also reveal that he knows next to nothing about Indian history,
not the most impressive qualification, some would say, for one who is dealing
with a book of collected essays by a historian born and brought up in India
(though spending most of his professional life in England and Australia), all but
one of which are concerned with aspects of Indian history. Quite so, but this
is a book that lives up to its title: no matter how little (or, I suspect, how much)
its readers may know about Indian history, they will come away from Citizen
Historian not only better informed, but intellectually enriched by sharing the
explorations over thirty four years of one who is at home in three cultures: that of
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India; that of the world where English is the nati ve tongue; and that of the world
of international scholarship. Scholarship tout court is the right word here-
Professor Mukhetjee is a historian who has learned from other disciplines; has
worked and published with the late Sir Edmund Leach, the British anthropologist;
and has not only written on aspects of literature, both British and Indian (there are
two such essays in the book under review), but has introduced a Bengali novelist
to an English language readership by means of his own translation.
First, a glance at the range of Citizen Historian: in eight essays, all but one of
which have been published previously as papers or as anicles, the first as long ago
as 1961, we are introduced to topics as various as the question of polygamy
and genealogy in the Gupta period, to that of the role of the novel as a
historical source, with panicular reference here to Satinath Bhaduri's The
Vigil and the Indian revolt of August 1942 against the Raj. Others look at the
origins of Indian nationalism; Indian historians and the Rama Gupta tradition;
British administrators and their ideological construction of the Indian village
community; the political thought of the great Bengali intellectual and reformer
Raja Rammohun Roy; another on his approach to the question of the status of
women; and one on aspects of the thought of that remarkable English example of
the 18th century Enlightenment, Sir William Jones, who lies at the core of
Mukherjee's monograph, Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth-Century
British Attitudes to India, the second edition of which was published in Bombay
in 1987. The common element throughout is the interest in some of the central
problems of the profession of writing history both now and in the past, for
the subtitle of this collection is not a catchy label, but a genuine guide to the
main ingredient of the contents.
The opening essay, from the title of which that of the book is taken, is a credo.
Mukherjee is a Marxist, not of the barbarous tribe of those who strap their readers
onto the bed of dialectic and torture them with jargon, but rather, one of those
whose eyes were opened to the marvellous complexity and inter-connectedness
of things by Marx, as was the case with Eric Hobsbawm and Pierre Vilar, and has
never forgotten or regretted it, but would never confuse Marx with a Moses who
came down from the mountain bearing the Table of the Law. In explaining why he
believes that history matters, why historians matter, and why the nature of the
world in which they write matters to historians, Mukherjee ends this piece with a
telling quotation from R. G. Collingwood, who, as he rightly points out, nobody
could ever mistake for a Marxist. He could equally well, I think, have found
suppon in Thucydides-on this score Mukherjee stands in an ancient and
honourable tradition, one in which Marx also stands of course, whatever the
failings may be of his vulgarisers.
The final essay, 'My Discovery of Nehru: Autobiography as History', should
be required reading for everyone who has any interest at all in the India of the last
years of the British Empire, and will serve as an antidote for any, if such there still
be, w~o regret the passing of the Raj; and likewi~e~forany who imagine, as some
still do, that successful nationalist movements lead straight to paradise.
No book from an academic publisher would be complete these days without its
complement of typographical errors, and this one has its share, but no more than
its fair share. Even non-historians would have little trouble tracking down via the
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on-line the correct title ofthe journal which appears here as Annales Econotrues.
Soci~t~s. Civilisations (p.7), and none of the others are serious enough to throw
the reader off the scent.
G. B. Harrison
Heather Kerr, Robin Eaden, and Madge Mitton, eds, Slaake_peare:
World View_, Newark: University of Delaware Press, and London:
Associated University Presses, 199ft
Shakespeare: World Views presents fifteen papers from a conference 'Shakespeare
Outside England' held at Adelaide in 1992. The editors admit that the conference
theme was open to liberal interpretation, and this has resulted in a mixture of
papers on different kinds of subject. On my count most of the papers are not
concerned with Shakespeare at all. but with adaptations and productions of
Shakespeare in countries other than England. In other words, they are external
literary and theatrical history. Some of the papers do offer to discuss Shakespeare's
texts, and do so from a variety of points of view. The editors claim that all this
succeeds in doing is to 'unsettle Shakespeare as a stable indicator of cultural
values', and to 'unsettle confident claims for Shakespearean universality'. But
this is absurd. How can adaptations of Shakespeare (e.g. Tate's) tell us anything
about Shakespeare? In the most extreme case, how can Ducis' Othello-a re-
writing of the Othello story, and therefore a totally different play-tell us
anything about Shakespeare's Othello? It tells us much about French tastes in the
I790s, but that is another matter. That a production of Shakespeare must be an
interpretation is true. But it can also be a misinterpretation. Most of the conUibutors
to this volume evade or neglect the issue of validity. The postmodernist ideology
of the editors' preface would collapse Shakespeare into the history of Shakespearean
productions. This is merely imperialism on the part of petfonnance studies.
By my judgment only six of the papers are good, four are average, and five are
poor. Moreover, since many of them are either introductory surveys of their topic,
or programmatic assertions about what it would be good to study, one does not
feel that one has learned very much in depth by the end of the book.
The very best papers are by Martin Prochazka. and Werner Habicht. Prochazka
discusses the uses of Shakespeare by different political forces in the Czech lands
since the late eighteenth century. But his paper is not merely historical. His very
scholarly account is conducted within a theoretical framework that allows him to
consider the issues of agency and subjectification in the relations between popular
movements, imperialist authority, and theatrical institutions. Habicht also is
theoretically sophisticated. He charts the development and transfonnations of the
myth of 'our Shakespeare' in Gennany. the myth by which Shakespeare was
appropriated for Gennan nationalism from the eighteenth century onwards.
The other good papers are by Golder, Morley, Camino, and Parsons. John
Golder gives an infonnative and amusing account of Jean-Francois Duds' re-
writings of Shakespeare's stories for the French stage in the last third of the
eighteenth century, with a special focus on the Othello of 1792, produced in the
context of the conflict between the Girondins and the Jacobins. Golder interestingly
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points up the paradox of the persistence ofneo-c1assicaltaste in the revolutionary
decade: Othello loses his blackness; Iago is omitted altogether as too monstrous;
the handkerchief becomes a diamond tiara; and so on. Michael Morley traces
Brecht's responses to Hamlet from the I920s onwards, and usefully shows how
Brecht, unlike postmodemists, thought he was gelling back through falsifying
traditions to a real Shakespeare. Mercedes Maroto Camino makes a detailed and
incisive study of The Rape of Lucrece from a Foucaldian-feminist standpoint,
using the notion of the Renaissance map as an instrument of imperialist conquest,
and analogizing the map to the poetic blazon of a woman's body. Philip Parsons
describes vividly his experiments in producing Shakespeare in reconstructed
Elizabethan stage conditions, both in Penh and in Sydney. By dogged intuition
and imagination Parsons recreates what must have been the styles of acting and
the uses of the stage in the English Renaissance.
In the second rank of papers stand those of Gay, Carruthers, Manin, and
Billington. Penny Gay responds to Parsons' account of his experiments,
unfonunately repeating much of what he has already said, but also making some
telling criticisms of Parsons' weak points, such as his tendency to dismiss the
relevance of the actors' and director's own experience of life for producing
Shakespeare in reconstructed Elizabethan conditions. Ian Carruthers gives a
detailed but rather uncritical account ofSuzuki Tadashi' s adaptations ofMacbeth.
Jacqueline Manin blandly describes the history of Shakespearean productions in
Sweden, without much in the way of value judgment or theoretical engagement.
Michael Billington, Drama Critic for The Guardian. enthusiastically describes
the non-British productions of Shakespeare he has seen around the world.
I forbear to mention the other papers. They are too superficial, or too gestural-
acceptable perhaps for a conference. but tiardly for a book.
The editors' pretentious claims raise expectations ofsome theoretical exploration
of the relationship between Shakespeare, and the history of the reception,
appropriation, and adaptation of Shakespeare, but these are not met. This is
especially disappointing as there are not only differences of theoretical and
ideological standpoint between the papers, but also contradictions. For example,
Billington, and Carruthers' Suzuki believe in a universalist Shakespeare, a being
officially denied by the editors, and rejected explicitly by some of the contributors
(and ignored by the others). Nobody even begins to consider at the level of theory
the relation between (putative) human universality, socio-historical specificity,
and authorial individuality. Billington wants to preserve a notion ofShakespeare's
universality if only because he knows that Britain itself is now a multi-cultural
society. And yet he is happy to speak of Japanese or Romanian productions as if
Japan and Romania were monocultural societies. It seems that only 'Englishness'
is to be abolished by postmodern, post-colonial critics; other nations, we are to
believe, have preserved a homogeneous culture, despite the transnational
movements of capital, labour, Hollywood, and McDonald's. The feeble-
mindedness of post-colonial 'theory' is suggested by the invocation by one
contributor of 'the southern hemisphere' as a category with which to study
Shakespearean production in Australia. That the relation of nationality to culture
cannot be treated at the level of intellectual fashion is indicated by a striking
contrast between this post-colonial geographer and Werner Habicht. The former
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is an Australian nationalist who evidently wants to study 'our Shakespeare.' The
latter knows what nationalism has done to Germany, and as a modem liberal is
desperate to get rid of 'unser Shakespeare.' Habicht, understandably, favours
'the international style' in Shakespeare production! The theoretical position
commonly assumed in this book is an old-fashioned historicist relativism, which
nobody feels obliged to question.
Postmodernism, we are told, has superseded the Enlightenmenl.It seems to me
that if the issue of the value of Shakespeare is to be treated with anything like
intellectual seriousness, we would do well to revive the eighteenth-century notion
of 'rational admiration.' The postmodemist contributors to this volume seem to
be unable to distinguish between judging a writer's merits, and analysing the uses
to which a writer's works may be put as a means to the end of ideological
conditioning.
David Brooks
Mary Warnock, Imagination and Time, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1994.
The strong impression of being in the presence of a lively, engaged and engaging
intellect, is no doubt heightened by the fact that Imagination aruJ Time is based on
two sets of public lectures: the Gifford Lectures and the Read-Tuckwell Lectures,
presented during 1992 at the University of Glasgow and the University of Bristol,
respectively. Warnock ranges widely in her treatment of the imagination. Hume
and Kant, Coleridge and Wordsworth, Sartre and Partit, Merleau-Ponty and
Strawson, Collingwood and Dennett, are just a few of the authors whom she
considers. Strange bed-fellows, perhaps, but Warnock's study of these philosophers
and poets contributes to her forcefully argued, if sometimes contentious, views
concerning personal identity, time, symbolism, morality, history, and the important
place of the imagination in education. Warnock represents a type of scholarship
that, sadly, is increasingly rare. She maintains that philosophy cannot be fruitfully
practised in the absence of a knowledge of its history or the traditional cultural
values which it assumes. Her references to both theology and literature, and the
way in which each overlaps with philosophical thought, offer important insights
into her conception of the imagination. Warnock's considerable knowledge of
these overlapping fields yields a rich and complex thesis. Human knowledge and
understanding, Warnock maintains, are inseparable from the creative power of
the imagination which, in tum, is crucial to the formation and maintenance of
shared values.
Warnock argues that it is the creative power of the imagination that distingUishes
human from non-human animals. Imagination is crucial to the formation of
personal identity. It is what allows us to be aware of ourselves not only in the
present but also as beings who exist in time: beings who have a past and a future.
Furthermore, imagination gives rise to feelings of sympathy toward others and so
provides the foundation for the existence of human communities and shared
values. Imagination is the source of compassion and sociability and without it the
cooperative and cumulative nature of human discovery and knowledge would be
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impossible. Warnock sees imaginative genius as a particular capacity through
which some individuals create new knowledge or combine existing knowledge in
ways which lead to new insights.
Warnock's aim is to link a common and essentially timeless understanding
with imagination' (p.70). She seeks to achieve this aim by offering a bold and
interesting account of the role of symbolism in human life. Warnock draws a
distinction between arbitrary or conventional symbols and those which she calls
'full-blooded', or 'natural'. Unlike the conventional symbol of, say, a flag at half-
mast, full-blooded symbols are those 'which we seem to be able to interpret
without rules, and without learning' (p.70). Such symbols fonn the basis for a
common understanding of the significance of natural phenomena, including
human life. The power of imaginative genius is that it may symbolically reveal
the truth not only of the poet's or philosopher's nature but the truth of human
nature. Although all human beings possess imagination, Warnock locates the
imaginative genius of the exceptional individual in this capacity to derive universal
truth from panicular experiences. She assens that we could not understand
Thucydides, Plato or Aristotle, if it were not the case that (at least some) human
values possess a trans-historical and cross-cultural pennanence and adds, 'humans
remain [more or less) the same throughout time' (pp.87-88).
Literature, an, music, morality, the history of ideas, all contribute to our grasp
of truth. Adequate study of such matters necessarily involves some understanding
not just of the present but also of the past-how do we come to know, believe, or
value those things that we do know, believe and value? As well as history in the
narrow disciplinary sense, Warnock is concerned with history (or 'story-telling')
in the broadest sense, including autobiography. 'Story-telling' is central to all
human cultures because it is through stories that individuals and communities
maintain themselves over time. Warnock is keenly aware that such a view
introduces a tension into her account of the role of the imagination to the
attainment of truth. Imagination may foster false, as well as true, narratives.
Warnock's treament of this problem (along with the now standard side-swipe at
Derrida and postmodernism) is the least satisfying pan of the book. She offers an
interesting, though brief, argument concerning the necessary publicity ofknowledge
and values and insists on the vinue of 'common sense' in avoiding relativism. The
distinction between story-telling as pure invention and story-telling as truth-
revealing is rather tenuously drawn and Warnock's pragmatic account of the
difference between history and stories avoids, ratherthan confronts, the difficulty.
Whereas stories have a beginning, a middle and an end, history, Warnock tells us,
is a story without end, which we continue through our actions. The problem with
her views on truth, relativism and shared values becomes clear in the final chapter
which concerns the practical issue of the education of chi Idren.
In addition to acquiring the skills needed to make one's ideas available to
others, education must, Warnock argues, include the passing on of stories and
shared values to the next generation. Our knowledge about ourselves, our past,
our values, our entire cultural heritage, is necessarily public. Ultimately, it is
knowledge such as this that allows us to assign meaning to ourselves, our lives
and actions, and our shared communities. Without such knowledge human life
would cease to be fully human and we would lack the ability to form cohesive
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communities grounded in shared values. Warnock st3te~ that educating the
imagination of children should be valued by all those who desire to maintain their
culture and the values upon which it is based. She writes 'the imagination is
crucial in the acceptance of shared and continuing values. It is not surprising,
therefore, that I would [also) argue that the education of the imagination is by far
the most important educational goal, and that which should be central in any
curriculum decisions' (p.173). And later, that '[t]he past is continuous with the
present. Just as, for an individual, his memory shapes what he is now, so, in the
public domain, history makes us, the living, what we are, and gives us the
understanding that may help us shape the future' (p. I76). There is little reason to
assume that Warnock intends her thesis to apply equally to different cultural
groups, each of which possesses a distinct cultural heritage which its bearers will
desire to pass on to their children. Warnock's ideas on education are disturbing
precisely because she does not appear to acknowledge that notions of history and
culture are contested terms in contemporary societies. Although she offers a brief
discussion of multiculturalism, her recommendations for the education ofchildren
take little account of the profound differences between the various ethnic, racial
and national groups which typically compose modern polities. There is little
recognition that modern polities consist of groups from many different cultures-
each of which has a history. Warnock's stories, and the many writers to whom she
refers throughout Imagination and Time, are exclusively British and European.
This is not a problem per se. The problem arises when one considers that for some
children, the telling of such stories may not have the enabling consequences
which Warnock predicts: impaning a sense of belonging, of self-respect and pride
in oneself and one's past, and a sense of purpose for the future. In fact, for some
children, it is these very stories which may inhibit them from realising their
powers, capacities and freedom to act.
Moira Gatens
AnthonyJulius, T. S. Eliot, anti·Semimm, andLiteraryForm, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995,
One of the most serious charges to have been brought against T. S. Eliot and his
poetry and prose is that he was and they are anti-Semitic. The gravity of the
allegation is intensified,. in Eliot's case, because of his publicly-professed
Christianity. Christianity developed out of Judaism: scripturally, theologically
and liturgically. To be anti-Semitic and Christian is a contradiction in terms, as
Eliot recognised:
I am not an anti-Semite [he remarked in 1956] and never have been. It is a
terrible slander on a man.... in the eyes of the Church, to be anti-Semitic is
a sin.
To what extent, if at all, can Eliot be implicated in this ancient prejudice? More
specifically, can he be charged with having contributed to the persecution of the
Jews under Nazism, through the influence of his writings before the Second
World War?
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Although Christopher Ricks has devoted a chapter to the subject in T. S. Eliot
and Prejudice, the only complete study is Anthony Julius' T. S. Eliot, anti-
Semitism, and Literary Fonn. Julius claims both that Eliot was thoroughly
possessed of the prejudice and that he contributed to the persecution of the Jews in
the modem age. 'Of the many different kinds of anti-Semite, Eliot was the rarest
kind', he writes, 'one who was able to place his anti-Semitism at the service of his
art.'
Julius' intense personal engagement with his topic is revealed at the beginning
of his study, when he records that the lines in 'Gerontion' (1920),
And the Jew squats on the window-sill, the owner,
Spawned in some estaminet of Antwerp,
Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London
'sting like an insult'. From the outset, in other words, before he has assembled
such evidence as he is able to bring to it, we confront the major problem with
Julius' argument. The author is aggrieved: he is Jewish and he has been gravely
insulted by Eliot. These are facts which cannot be contradicted. But Julius
deduces from his personal experience of outrage both the racist convictions and
the anti-Semitic intentions of Eliot and their effect, on Jews and non-Jews alike,
before the Holocaust and since. He demands that Eliot's readers agree with him
(including those many distinguished Jewish critics who have not been similarly
disquieted and whom Julius savages for their failure to respond correctly). His
argument focuses on the half-a-dozen explicit Jewish allusions in the entire body
of Eliot's work and on other instances where Julius discerns an unspoken anti-
Semitism.
Such ideologically-driven analyses of literature have become familiar in the
academy, with the same intimidating pseudo-morality: failure to recognise that an
author is promoting unacceptable ideas and to concur that his work must be
indicted for the beliefs and prejudices it allegedly proposes, is to align oneself
with the oppressor. Objective truth is the last consideration in what Harold
Bloom has described as the 'School of Resentment'. Indeed, Julius turns on the
Jewish critic, Wolf Mankowitz, for failing to denounce 'Gerontion', displaying
thereby a 'demeaning absence of resentment' toward its author.
Meeting the argument about the scarcity of Eliot's anti-Semitic allusions,
Julius protests that it is the 'centrality' not the 'quantity' that matters. But how
'central' to Eliot's work or thought can a couple of dozen words in the contexts of
hundreds ofthousands be, particularly when some of these-as in 'Gerontion'-
are spoken by a character created by the poet, not necessarily representative of the
poet himself? Gerontion's observation about the Jew is satiric as much ridiculing
the speaker, the 'little old man' synonymous with decaying European culture
after the First World War, as the subjects of his disdain, including Hakagawa,
Madame de Tornquist and Fraulein von Kulp. Julius is not concerned with the
prejudices that these xenophobic caricatures might reveal. Was Eliot anti-Japanese,
French and German as well as anti-Semitic? Possibly-his critique being of
humanity at large, not one racial and religious group within it.
The genre of satire is no respecter of persons or of religions or races, and for
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Julius to argue that the passing reference to the Jew in 'Gerontion' degrades the
Jewish race, is as compelling as to argue that Milton's Paradise of Fools degrades
Catholics, or that Eliot's 'Sweeney' poems insult the Irish. The Irish critic, Denis
Donoghue, rejects that charge, commenting that to call Eliot anti-Irish is 'as
specious' as to call him anti-Semitic. Julius, in tum, rebukes Donoghue, accusing
him of not 'caring' about anti-Semitism.
Julius argues that we should be 'bothered' by Eliot's anti-Semitism. How
much bother is needed when the most that Eliot could be charged with, a Jewish
critic, Irving Howe, has claimed, is 'a few incidental lines of bigotry'? Cynthia
Ozick similarly fails to be 'bothered' by 'the handful of insults'. Not significantly
'bothered', either, is George Steiner, Julius finding it 'troubling' that yet another
Jewish critic fails to be stung into 'resentment'.
As Julius fails to contextualise, within the corpus, so he fails to place Eliot's
remarks historically. Eliot's offending passages represent Jews negatively, but to
assess their degree of negativity, to reach a balanced judgement about how
egregious they were when published (rather than how they might appear to be,
with the hindsight of the Holocaust), we only need to read a few writings of
contemporary authors to find that Eliot's half-dozen remarks are typical rather
than exceptional, and milder than those of many writers of his period, such as D.
H. Lawrence and Tennessee Williams. This does not excuse them, but it explains
them in a social context wherein equally savage comments were made about
Protestants by Catholics, and vice versa, which today would be unthinkable
outside Northern Ireland. As A. N. Wilson wisely observes in his recent biography
of Paul ('a Jew ofJews', by his own account), with regard to the apostle's assorted
prejudices, 'to be unenlightened because one shares the beliefs and attitudes of
one's own time and group is not to deserve singling out for vilification'.
'I hate Jews', Lawrence wrote (of himself, not as a character in a poem or a
novel), referring to his New York publisher, Thomas Seltzer, 'and I want to learn
to be more wary of them'. Using bestial imagery, he spoke of 'moneyhogs in
motorcars, mostly Jews', and the priest of love also referred, at the beginning of
the 19305, to 'those little Jew booksellers'. As one of Lawrence's biographers
points out, none of this was exceptional by the standards of the day. To present it
otherwise is to rewrite history.
In the decade when Lawrence was hating Jews, Eliot was writing, in After
Strange Gods (1934) that, in an ideal society, 'reasons of race and religion
combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable'. Apart
from the phrase in 'Gerontion', this is the favourite text of those who indict Eliot
for anti-Sel1)itism and Julius works it hard. But as Ricks has pointed out, Eliot's is
a statement with which a rabbi might 'concur', and 'Eliot never spared free-
thinking Christians' either. Julius is not bothered by what Eliot has to say, from
his Anglo-Catholic perspective, about the Free Churches (in 'Reunion by
Destruction', for example-which is more sustained and denunciatory than
anything he says about Jews). In 'free-thinking Jews', the epithet is at least as
important as the racial reference. But Julius, with his grievance, sees only 'Jews',
ignoring the important qualification.
Julius compares the poet's alleged anti-Semitism to his attitudes to women,
attempting to prove his case (with its scanty explicit evidence) by showing that the
152
Reviews
poet was swayed by assoned prejudices. The analogy is grossly flawed and further
reveals the weakness ofJulius' case. As Marja Palmer has recently shown, Eliot's
presentation of women in his poetry is a complex and ambiguous matter. Julius
sweepingly asserts that Eliot treats women with 'contempt', arguing that this is the
same attitude he brings to Jews. But how much contempt for women is revealed in
'Marina'? How are women degraded in Ash- Wednesday, in the various celebrated
forms in which they appear there, or in Eliot's dedication to his wife:
To whom lowe the leaping delight
That quickens my senses in our wakingtime
Even where women appear to be condemned, as in 'Ponrait of a Lady', the poem
turns out to be a denunciation of the young man in the work, who is less admirable
than the woman in her febrile romanticism, for at least she is passionate, alive. It
is the man, in the end, who is contemptible. Are the women in 'Prufrock'-
including the alluring mermaids-any more contemptible than the speaker of the
poem? Nor does the analogy work with regard to the number of instances where
women appear in Eliot's poetry as compared to Jews. Women are everywhere in
it. But then Julius argues that the absence of Jews is funher proof of Eliot's anti-
Semitism.
The most disgraceful charge that Julius brings against Eliot is that his work,
contributing to the 'anti-Semitism of his times', is one of the causes of the
Holocaust. 'After Strange Gods coincided with the inauguration of the Hitlerian
persecution', he writes, presenting the coincidence as if it were a sign ofcongruence
of convictions between the poet and the Nazi leader. Conveniently, he ignores
Eliot's published criticisms of the persecution of the Jews, during the War, as
early as 1941, when he insisted that there should be 'organised protest against
such injustice'.
Indicting Eliot for prejudice, Julius reveals his own. He dismisses Eliot's fony
years of poetry after The· Waste LaIUl as being 'too pious to be capable of fostering
anything other than vinue in its readers'. Apan from the extraordinary over-
simplification of this judgement (what pious vinue does 'The Hollow Men'
foster?), this is a clear example-if one were to apply Julius' own methods-{)f
anti-Christian bias. But some religious prejudices are more acceptable than
others. Gore Vidal can write, in the New York Review ofBooks, that 'Eliot ended
a mere Christian'. As Christopher Ricks points out:
ought liberal readers of the New York Review to acquiesce so happily in a
crass prejudice against Christianity such as they would never countenance
against any other religion?
But self-proclaimed 'liberals', like Julius, customarily extend their liberality only
so far as you are prepared to agree with them.
Julius' book is a 'terrible slander' (in Eliot's phrase) on Eliot. As it misrepresents
Eliot's poetry and prose, arguing that it is pervaded by anti-Semitism, it is
inaccurate about Eliot's attitude to Jews. He had several close Jewish friends
(including Groucho Marx, with whom he established a club in London). Eliot
wrote to Marx, in 1963, saying that 'I envy you going to Israel and I wish I could
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go there too... as I have a keen admiration for that country'. As this simply
contradicts Julius' thesis, he must pervert the generous comment and claim that
this was merely Eliot anempting to 'ingratiate himself-it could not possibly be
the expression of a genuine emotion. Yet when Eliot makes an apparently
negative comment about Jews. this must be read au pied de la lellre. Why would
Eliot, if he was anti-Semitic, bother to attempt to ingratiate himself with the
Jewish comedian (his friend of many years) who, moreover, was legendary for his
alertness to humbug? Certainly, if Eliot was attempting to ingratiate himself, the
attempt was resoundingly successful, Marx describing the poet as a 'dear man and
a charming host', providing further evidence of yet another Jew who failed to be
stung into resentment by Eliot.
Julius' book is. in other words. the worst sort of literary criticism, of a kind all
too familiar today. Instead of encouraging debate and discussion. it not only
presents its judgements (made. as they are, selectively and distortedly and out of
context) as the last word on the subject. but insists that if you do not accept them,
you, too, are blinded by the prejudice it alleges to have identified.
Barry Spurr
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